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BLAMING THE VICTIM: THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF SEXUAL HISTORY IN HOMICIDES
I. Introduction
On August 26, 1986, Robert Chambers killed Jennifer Levin in
Central Park in New York City.' The pretrial publicity centered as
much on the fact that the victim died while engaging in sex as on
the fact that she was killed. 2 New York newspapers reported the
homicide with such headlines as: " 'Wild Sex Killed Jenny,' 'Sex
Play Got Rough' and 'She Raped Me.' "I As in many rape cases,
the publicity that engulfed the killing was awash with the victim's
purported past sexual activity. 4 According to one former criminal
defense lawyer, "the [comparison] to a rape case is appropriate,"
because "[a]lthough it's a murder case as it's been publicized it's
been all about sexual relations." The fact "[tihat Jennifer Levin
got killed is treated as almost incidental." 5 Similarly, the head of
the sex crimes unit for the Manhattan District Attorney's office
6
sees the tactic of blaming the victim, which defense attorneys formerly
used in rape cases, as emerging in this case. 7 Just as some people
1. See Darkness Beneath the Glitter: Life of Suspect in Park Slaying, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 28, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
On March 25, 1988, Robert Chambers pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter
in the death of Jennifer Levin. On April 15, 1988, Chambers was sentenced to 5
to 15 years imprisonment. The sentence was agreed to by the Levin family, Chambers'
defense attorneys and the prosecution after the jury in Chambers' trial had remained
deadlocked during nine days of deliberation. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1988, at
33, col. 2.
2. See, e.g., Sexual Politics and a Slaying. Anger at Chambers's Defense, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1986, at Al, col. I [hereinafter Sexual Politics and a Slaying]. But
see Trial Opening For Chambers in Park Killing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at
BI, col. 5 (prosecutor in case has stated that sex may not have played any part
in killing).
3. See Sexual Politics and a Slaying, supra note 2, at AI, col. 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. (quoting Judith Levin).
6. See An Aggressive Defense-or 'Obscene' Quest?, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 13, 1987,
at 10, cols. 1-3 [hereinafter Aggressive Defense].
7. Id.; cf. Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 48, 51 (plaintiff's
attorney in wrongful death suit involving Toxic Shock Syndrome argued that
questions during deposition regarding late wife's sexual habits'were used to harass
and intimidate plaintiff into dropping suit).
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once believed that "women who get raped are 'asking for it,' "8 a
morbid twist has some people blaming Jennifer Levin for her own
death. 9
Many states have enacted rape-shield statutes to reduce the at-
tention directed at a rape victim's past sexual behavior. 0 Arguably,
rape-shield statutes have done much to redress perceived biases
inherent in the legal system" by prohibiting a defendant from making
the sexual conduct of a woman-victim an issue. 2 The 1986 Report
of the New York State Task Force on Women in the Courts, however,
concluded that "[tihe attitudes embodied in the former law [per-
taining to rape] ... continue to operate in the minds of some judges,
jurors, defense attorneys and prosecutors."' 3
This Note analyzes whether legislation analogous to rape-shield
statutes should be enacted to limit testimony concerning the prior
sexual history of a murder victim. Part II discusses the historical
development of rape-shield statutes and the policies underlying their
enactment. Part III examines the constitutionality of rape-shield
statutes, analyzing Davis v. Alaska 4 and Chambers v. Mississippi,"
the leading Supreme Court cases cited by opponents of these statutes.
8. See Aggressive Defense, supra note 6, at 10, col. 3.
9. Id.
10. See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Berger].
11. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5381-5393, at 509-10 (1980) ("[ilf the common law rule admitting evidence of
the victim's prior sexualconduct was based on male distrust of female witnesses,
the reform statutes are in large part shaped by female distrust of male judges")
[hereinafter WRIGHT & GRAHAMI; see, e.g., Berger, supra note 10, at 32-39. Feminists
argue that the law permitting defendants to introduce evidence of prior sexual
conduct is a remnant of prior law. See, e.g., Gold & Wyatt, The Rape System:
Old Rules and New Times, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 695, 695 (1978). The procedure,
in effect, makes the victim a co-defendant, not a witness.
12. Rape-shield laws are "aimed at eliminating a common defense strategy of
trying the complaining witness rather than the defendant. The result of this strategy
was harassment and further humiliation of the victim as well as discouraging victims
of rape from reporting the crimes to law enforcement authorities." State v. Williams,
224 Kan. 468, 470, 580 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1978).
Rape-shield statutes prevent judges from allowing excesses that were permitted
under common law. despite the fact that these excesses were more than likely
unjustified. See, e.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 684-86 (8th Cir.
1953) (judge permitted testimony of prior sexual conduct by victim, beaten brutally
by defendant, as evidence of consent), overruled, United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d
268 (8th Cir. 1978).
13. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, reprinted in 15
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 62 (1987).
14. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
15. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
19881 SEXUAL HISTOR Y ADMISSIBILITY
Part III also contains a discussion of the rationale behind state court
decisions upholding the constitutionality of rape-shield statutes. Next,
Part IV considers whether existing law concerning the right of privacy
and testimonial privileges may be construed to enable the family
members of a murder victim to prevent the exposure of a deceased
victim's sexual past. Based upon this analysis, the Note proposes
legislation to extend the protection of rape-shield statutes to deceased
victims of sex crimes.
I1. Historical Development of Rape-Shield Laws
During the mid-1970's, lawmakers throughout the nation proposed
laws that restricted the scope of admissible evidence of past sexual
conduct in rape prosecutions. 6 These statutes, commonly known as
rape-shield laws, were quickly passed by state legislatures 7 and by
Congress.'" By 1980, forty-eight states had enacted some form of
rape-shield statute.' 9 Professor Harriett R. Galvin, in a critique and
analysis of existing rape-shield statutes,20 has classified them by four
distinct models: the Michigan, 2' Texas,22 Federal23 and California
approaches.24
16. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal
for the Second Decade, 70 M1NN. L. REV. 763, 765 (1986) [hereinafter Galvin].
17. By 1976, over half the states had enacted some form of rape-shield statute.
See Berger, supra note 10, at 32.
18. See J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE-RULES AND STATUTE SUPPLEMENT 47-51 (1984)
(discussing bill in House of Representatives) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN].
19. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 906-07, Table I (listing federal and state
statutes restricting admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct in rape trials).
The two states without rape-shield statutes are Utah and Arizona. In Utah, when
the issue is consent, probative evidence pertaining to the victim's reputation or
moral character is considered to outweigh any prejudicial factors and is, therefore,
admissible. See State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah 1975). In Arizona,
evidence regarding the unchaste reputation of the victim is admissible in situations
involving consent or the refutation of scientific or physical evidence. See State ex
rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 29, 545 P.2d 946, 953 (1976).
The rape-shield statutes have aroused great interest. See generally Berger, supra
note 10, at i; Galvin, supra note 16, at 906; see also 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 11, at 510; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
FORCIBLE RAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES (1978); Herman, What's Wrong
With the Rape Reform Laws?, 3 Civ. LIBERTIES REV. 60 (Dec. 1976/Jan. 1977)
[hereinafter Herman]; Ireland, Reform Rape Legislation: A New Standard of Sexual
Responsibility, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 185 (1978).
20. See Galvin, supra note 16.
21. Id. at 812-76.
22. Id. at 876-83.
23. Id. at 883-93.
24. Id. at 894-902.
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The Michigan approach25 has been termed the "inflexible legislature
rule."'  This type of statute bars admission of evidence of the victim's
past sexual conduct subject to specific enumerated exceptions.27 For
example, all statutes patterned on the Michigan statute permit the
introduction of evidence concerning sexual conduct between the ac-
cused and the complainant.2" The exceptions outlined in such statutes
demonstrate attempts by legislatures to determine in what instances
evidence of prior sexual history may be relevant and material to
the presentation of a defendant's case29 and thus, required by the
sixth amendment of the Constitution.
The Texas approach,30 or the "untrammeled judicial discretion
approach," 3 differs significantly from the Michigan classification.3 2
25. Twenty-five states have enacted laws similar to the Michigan statute. See
ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1987);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 115-117 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510.145 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.498 (West
1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B
(Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. CoiM,. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(J) (West Supp. 1987);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4)
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1986);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Anderson 1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3104 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1987); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 972.11(2), 971.31(11) (West 1985); ME. R. EvID. 412; MINN. R. EVID.
404(c); N.C. R. EVID. 412; see also Galvin, supra note 16, at 906.
26. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 876. Professor Galvin criticizes the Michigan
type statutes because the legislative determination regarding an entire category of
evidence precludes consideration of the specific facts and circumstances of the case
or the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Id. at 872.
27. Id. at 871 n.518 ("[tihe two exceptions are: (1) evidence of sexual conduct
between the complainant and the accused; and (2) evidence of specific instances
of sexual activity showing the source of origin of semen, pregnancy or disease").
28. Id. at 815. In addition, Professor Leon Letwin has stated the following:
The goal of rationally untangling what happened between the two persons
on the charged occasion requires one to understand the history of their
sexual relationship. Quite apart from any character implications, this
prior relationship bears too heavily on the complainant's probable conduct
on the charged occasion, as well as on the motivation for her present
accusation, to be excluded.
Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology and the California Rape Evidence Laws,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 35, 72 (1980).
29. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 872.
30. Nine states have enacted statutes similar to the Texas approach. See ALASKA
STAT. § 12.45.045 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.1-4 (1977 & Supp. 1985);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1-3 (West Supp. 1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983); N.M.
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In the majority of jurisdictions employing the Texas approach, a
defendant is permitted to introduce any evidence pertaining to the
prior sexual history of the complainant provided that there is a
judicial determination of relevancy 33-i.e., that prejudicial effect out-
weighs probative value.3 4 Courts make relevancy determinations at
in camera hearings to avoid exposing the jury to information which
may taint the fact-finding process and to prevent unwarranted ex-
posure of the private life of the complainant before a verdict is
rendered.3"
The third model, labeled the Federal approach, 36 combines aspects
of both the Michigan and the Texas statutes. Key features include: 7
(1) a general prohibition of sexual conduct evidence; (2) several
exceptions permitting sexual conduct evidence considered indis-
putably relevant to an effective defense; and (3) a "catch-basin"
provision authorizing the trial court to determine the admissibility
of unexpected sexual conduct evidence on a case-by-case basis
according to a prescribed standard.3 8
The Federal rape-shield statute, Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,3 9 illustrates this approach. 40
R. EVID. 11-413; see also Galvin, supra note 16, at 907. Texas repealed its original
statute on September 1, 1986, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 685, § 9(b), and enacted
a statute similar to the federal approach. TEX. CRIM. EVID. RULES ANN. R. 412
(Vernon 1985).
31. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 876.
32. Id.
33. Id. (seven of the nine states following Texas approach).
34. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
35. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 877.
36. See id. at 883. Five states have enacted statutes similar to the federal
approach. In addition, the military has enacted a comparable rape-shield statute.
See FED. R. EVID. 412; MIL. R. EVID. 412; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f
(West 1985); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40.210 (1984); HAW. R. EvID. 412; IOWA R. EvID. 412; see also Galvin,
supra note 16, at 907.
37. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 883.
38. Id.
39. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides the following:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit
rape, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an
alleged victim of such rape or assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit
rape, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation
or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence other
than reputation or opinion evidence is-
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Under the fourth legislative grouping, known as the California
approach, 4' evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct is
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(l) and (c)(2) and is
constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered
by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not,
with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused
upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual
behavior with respect to which rape or assault is alleged.
(c)(l) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent
to commit rape intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific
instances of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall
make a written motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen days
before the date on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered
is scheduled to begin, except that the court may allow the motion to
be made at a later date, including during trial, if the court determines
either that the evidence is newly discovered and could not have been
obtained earlier through the exercise of due diligence or that the issue
to which such evidence relates has newly arisen in the case. Any motion
made under this paragraph shall be served on all other parties and on
the alleged victim.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a
written offer of proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof
contains evidence described in subdivision (b), the court shall order a
hearing in chambers to determine if such evidence is admissible. At such
hearing the parties may call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and
offer relevant evidence. Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of rule 104, if
the relevancy of the evidence which the accused seeks to offer in the
trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at
the hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled
for such purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such
condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in
paragraph (2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is
relevant and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial
to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence which may
be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be
examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means
sexual behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which
rape or assault with intent to commit rape is alleged.
FED. R. EVID. 412.
40. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 884.
41. Id. at 894. Six states have enacted laws similar to the California statute.
See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 3508, 3509 (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-70 (Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 48.069, 50.090 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-14 to -15 (1985); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020
(Supp. 1987); see also Galvin, supra note 16, at 894.
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separated into two categories, "depending on the purpose for which
it is offered." ' 42 The first category involves substantive evidence or
evidence offered to prove consent, while the second category centers
on credibility evidence proffered to attack the credibility of the
complainant.4 3 Evidence of consent is prohibited unless it pertains
to the complainant's previous sexual history with the accused." Like
Texas-approach statutes, however, California-approach statutes re-
quire that the judge first decide the issue of relevancy outside the
hearing of the jury. 45
Rape-shield statutes changed, to a degree, the common law rule
that permitted the defense to introduce evidence of the sexual history
of the complainant during trial.4 6 Under case law 4 7 a defendant
accused of rape was able to question the complainant as to her
possible unchaste48 character.4 9 This type of questioning was con-
sidered permissible for several reasons. First, the evidence was con-
sidered relevant because it was thought to show the complainant's
propensity to engage in sexual relations. Frequency of sexual relations
in turn, was thought to bear on the issue of consent, 0 which, if




46. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 546 (1980) [hereinafter Tanford & Bocchino].
47. At common law, the sexual history of the victim was always admissible.
Traditional wisdom depicted rape as a peculiar offense. Many commentators sup-
ported admission of this evidence because they viewed women as having vindictive
natures and overactive imaginations. Thus, accusations by women who had been
raped required different treatment from allegations of other crimes. See Berger,
supra note 10, at 7-22.
48. " 'Chastity' denotes abstention from premarital or extramarital intercourse."
See id. at 15 n.94.
49. The courts considered the victim's unchastity essential to the issue of consent.
"The underlying thought here is that it is more probable that an unchaste woman
would assent . . .than a virtuous woman." Id. (quoting People'v. Collins, 25 Ill.
2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962)).
Judge Cowan, in the much quoted People v. Abbot, differentiated between a
woman "who has already submitted herself to the lewd embraces of another, and
the coy and modest female, severely chaste and instinctively shuddering at the
thought of impurity," and asked: "And will you not more readily infer assent in
the practiced Messalina, in loose attire than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?"
People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195-96 (N.Y. 1838).
50. Before Congress and state legislatures enacted rape-shield laws, such evidence
was admissible. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) advisory committee note ("an
accused may introduce pertinent evidence of the character of the victim, as in
support of . . . consent in a case of rape").
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established, was a complete defense to the charge of rape.5 1 Second,
some jurisdictions admitted this evidence for the purpose of im-
peaching the victim's credibility, reasoning that "promiscuity imports
dishonesty.'"2
Finally, courts were afraid of false charges by vindictive women.53
Indeed, judges frequently referred to the words of Sir Matthew Hale,
the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, that rape "is an ac-
cusation easily to be made . . . and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho never so innocent. ' '5 4
The movement to change the common law rule originated from
an alliance of women's rights groups and law enforcement officials.
Feminist organizations56 lobbied for legislation to prevent a rape trial
from turning into "inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials
51. Indeed, consent is still a defense to every sex offense in New York, except
the offense of consensual sodomy. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 1986)
(sex offenses; lack of consent).
(1) Whether or not specifically stated, it is an element of every offense
defined in this article, except the offense of consensual sodomy, that
the sexual act was committed without consent of the victim. (2) Lack
of consent results from: (a) Forcible compulsion; or (b) Incapacity to
consent; or (c) Where the offense charged is sexual abuse, any circum-
stances, in addition to forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent, in
which the victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the actor's
conduct. (3) A person is deemed incapable of consent when he is: (a)
less than seventeen years old; or (b) mentally defective; or (c) mentally
incapacitated; or (d) physically helpless.
Id.
52. Berger, supra note 10, at 16; see, e.g., Seals v. State, 114 Ga. 520, 40 S.E.
731, 732 (1902). But cf State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 40, 269 S.E.2d 110, 115
(1980) ("[i]f sexual experiences outside marriage render one woman less truthful
than her virgin sister, then sexual experience outside marriage would be an issue
at any trial where a woman was a witness").
53. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 46, at 546.
54. Id. (quoting M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (lst
American ed. Philadelphia 1847) (Ist ed. London 1736)).
55. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5382, at 493-505; see also
Williams v. State, 690 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (rape-shield law "was
promulgated to diminish the embarrassment and humiliation suffered by rape victims
and the consequential low rate of reporting the crime"); Aggressive Defense, supra
note 6, at 10, col. 2 (after enactment of rape-shield law, Manhattan conviction
rate for crime of rape was "75 to 90 percent" as compared with "10 percent"
conviction rate before passage of statute).
56. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5382, at 515. As a political
cause, the crime of rape became "a powerful metaphor for the sort of oppression
that many women found in the traditional roles assigned to them in our society."
Id. § 5382, at 516; see Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMPARTS, Sept.,
1971, at 35. "The same men and power structure who victimize women are engaged
in the act of raping Vietnam, raping Black people and the very earth we live upon.
Rape is a classic act of domination." Id.
[Vol. XVI
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of the defendant's innocence or guilt." 57 Moreover, prosecutors and
police favored reform of the common law rule because they believed
that the proposed laws would make it easier to obtain convictions. 8
Thus, in response to public opinion, and in recognition of the
invalidity of the assumptions upon which the common law doctrine
was based,59 Congress and state legislatures enacted rape-shield sta-
tutes .6
1II. The Constitutionality of Rape-Shield Laws
A. Background
Rape-shield laws have generated much controversy. 61 Scholars62
and civil libertarians 63 have expressed concern that foreclosing ques-
tions about a victim's prior sexual conduct in order to protect her
privacy rights64 may interfere with a defendant's sixth amendment,
57. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
58. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FORCIBLE
RAPE: FINAL PROJECT REPORT 56 (1978). Results from a survey of prosecutors
indicated that 65% believed that legislation repealing the common law rule admitting
prior sexual history would increase the effectiveness of the prosecutions. See id.
But see Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Pros-
ecution: An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REV. 543, 592-93 (1980). This study
found that the Washington rape reform statute had little effect in that state on
prosecutions of rape. Id. at 592.
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 46, at 545 (concluding some
rape-shield laws violate defendant's sixth amendment rights).
62. See, e.g., 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5387, at 566-90; Berger,
supra note 10, at 52-72.
63. See Herman, supra note 19, at 60. The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), strongly committed to the rights of criminal defendants and to women's
rights, was embroiled in controversy over the scope of the rape-shield laws. An
example that highlights the controversy follows:
Joan Little's acquittal was applauded by those who support[ed] the most
stringent rape law reform. Yet the defendant was permitted to prove
that the deceased sheriff had sexually abused other female inmates. That
evidence-of propensity or pattern and practice-was regarded as relevant
.... Relevance is not a street to be walked only as it suits one's
convenience or gender.
Id. at 68.
64. See, e.g., 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5382, at 522-23 (com-
plainant's-right of privacy should be "respected to the same degree as other witnesses
and [is] not to be sacrificed lightly to claims of relevance based upon a logic
tainted by sexist assumptions").
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rights to confront witnesses and present relevant evidence. 65 These
authorities have also expressed concern about the need to avoid
erroneous convictions. 66
B. Arguments Against Constitutionality
Opponents of rape-shield laws point to Davis v. Alaska,7 and
Chambers v. Mississippi,6 two Supreme Court decisions holding
certain state exclusionary rules of evidence unconstitutional. 69 In both
cases, the Court applied its highest level of judicial scrutiny because
sixth amendment rights were at issue.7 0 Thus, the state had to assert
a compelling governmental interest which justified infringing the
defendant's sixth amendment rights.7 In order to withstand judicial
scrutiny, legislation which would extend rape-shield laws to deceased
victim's of sex crimes must be considered in light of Davis72 and
Chambers. 3
1. Davis v. Alaska
In Davis v. Alaska,7 4 the state interest in question was the re-
habilitation and protection of juvenile delinquents. 75 A state statute
prevented the use of a juvenile's past criminal record for impeachment
65. Galvin, supra note 16, at 771; see Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 46, at
589 ("Itlhe state and federal governments may not legislate to alter the rules of
evidence so as to place unusual and new burdens on the accused's ability to defend
himself . . . . Shield laws also run afoul of the Constitution when they alter the
traditional standard for the admissibility of evidence").
66. Herman, supra note 19, at 63. Herman restated the following argument:
There is in many rape cases a potential conflict between the right of
the defendant to a fair trial and the complainant's right to have his or
her claim to protection of the law vindicated without undue invasion of
sexual privacy. In many cases this conflict may be irresolvable, and when
that is the case the right to a fair trial should not be qualified, no matter
how compelling the countervailing concerns.
Id. (quoting policy adopted at February, 1976, meeting of ACLU's Board of
Directors).
67. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
68. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
69. See Davis, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); see also
Galvin, supra note 16, at 802-03.
70. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 318; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.
71. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295-98.
72. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
73. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
74. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
75. Id. at 310-11.
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purposes.7 6 In Davis, the defendant was accused of grand larceny
and burglary in connection with the robbery of a safe.77 During the
trial, the state's crucial witness, one Richard Green,78 a sixteen-year
old boy, testified that Joshuaway Davis was one of the two men
he saw standing behind a blue car with "something like a crowbar
in his hands." 7 9 The safe80 was discovered on the same day and at
the very spot that Green testified he had seen the car.8
At trial, the defense attempted to cross-examine Green in order
to establish that he had previously been adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent. 82 The defense sought to demonstrate that Green, under
unreasonable pressure from the authorities, identified Davis to shift
police suspicion from himself. 83 The prosecutor invoked the state's
juvenile-shield law 4 to prevent any reference to Green's criminal
record in the interest of "protecting the anonymity of juvenile
offenders," 85 and to encourage the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
justice system. 86
The interests of the defendant, however, in admitting the juvenile's
criminal record were twofold. First, since Green was the main witness
for the prosecution, the "accuracy and truthfulness of [his] testimony
were key elements in the ts]tate's case." 87 Second, the effort by the
defense to cross-examine Green was a means of "revealing possible
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may
relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.""
The state court upheld the constitutionality of the juvenile-shield
law.89 The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that the
defendant's right of confrontation had been denied. 90 The Court,
76. Id. The Alaska statute provides in pertinent part that: "[t]he commitment
and placement of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as
evidence against the minor in a subsequent case or proceeding in any other court ......
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971).
77. Id. at 309-10,
78. Id. at 310.
79. Id.
80. The safe, which was later discovered to be the one stolen from the Polar
Bar, "had been pried open and [had its] contents removed." Id. at 309.
81. Id. at 310.
82. Id. at 312-13.
83. Id. at 311-13.
84. Id. at 311; see supra note 76.
85. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id. at 316.
89. Id. at 314.
90. Id. at 320.
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balancing the competing interests of the state and the defendant,
decided that the defendant's right to confront witnesses was "par-
amount to the [s]tate's policy of protecting a juvenile offender." 9
The Court did not challenge the validity of Alaska's policy of
protecting the confidentiality of its juvenile offenders. 92 Rather, it
reaffirmed its holding in Aford v. United States, - that a witness
has no rights which prevent the defense from exposing his criminal
record. 94 In short:
[N]o obligation is imposed on the court, ... to protect a witness
from being discredited on cross-examination, short of an attempted
invasion of his constitutional protection from self incrimination,
properly invoked. There is a duty to protect him from questions
which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely
to harass, annoy or humiliate him. 95
In Davis, the Court reasoned that "[w]hatever temporary embar-
rassment might result to Green or his family by disclosure of his
juvenile record . . . is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into
the influence of possible bias in the -testimony of a crucial identi-
fication witness. "96
Opponents of rape-shield statutes argue that Davis is applicable
to cases where false accusation is the issue.97 There are, however,
important distinctions between the two shield laws that should limit
the application of Davis.98 First, the policy considerations underlying
juvenile-shield statutes and rape-shield statutes differ.99 The basic
purpose behind the juvenile-shield law is to protect juvenile offenders
from public disclosure of their youthful transgressions, even though
highly relevant testimony would be excluded."" In contrast, two of
the main reasons behind enacting rape-shield laws were to exclude
evidence of the victim's chastity"" and to encourage rape victims to
report the crime to law enforcement officials.1'-' Indeed, those who
91. Id. at 319.
92. "We do not and need not challenge the [sitate's interest as a matter of its
own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve the anonymity
of a juvenile offender." Id.
93. 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
94. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
95. Alford, 282 U.S. at 694.
96. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319.
97. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5387, at 568.
98. Galvin, supra note 16, at 806.
99. Id. at 806.
100. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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were interested in changing evidentiary rules pertaining to rape cases
argued that proof of chastity "distorts the fact-finding process be-
cause jury prejudice towards the unchaste complainant may result
in unjust acquittals.''" 0 3
Second, the Court in Davis was concerned with the accuracy and
truthfulness of the witness.""' The chastity of a rape victim, however,
does not usually bear on a witness' honesty." 5 Thus, the issue of
chastity is not similar to evidence used to impeach a witness.3 6
Therefore, the Supreme Court's interest in reliability of the witness
presented to the jury for impeachment purposes is not present in
a rape trial.""7
2. Chambers v. Mississippi
In Chambers v. Mississippi, the defendant, Leon Chambers, was
charged with the murder of a law enforcement officer during an
altercation with police and a crowd of people in a rural Mississippi
town.' 8 During the trial, the defendant was prevented from estab-
lishing that one Gable McDonald had previously confessed to the
murder.0 9 Leon Chambers was convicted of murder." 0 On appeal,
the defendant claimed that his due process rights were violated"'
because he was not permitted to cross-examine McDonald in order
to elicit his confession." ' The appellate court ruled that the confession
was inadmissible because it was hearsay"3 and because the state's
voucher rule"' prohibited a party from impeaching his own witness." 5
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Chambers was denied
a fair trial ' 6 because his sixth amendment rights to cross-examine
witnesses and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor had been thwarted." 7 Although Chambers can be broadly
103. Galvin, supra note 16, at 806.
104. Davis, 415 U.S. at 317.
105. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
106. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5387, at 568-70.
107. Id.
108. 410 U.S. 284, 285-88 (1973).
109. Id. at 289.
110. Id. at 285.
Ill. Id. at 289-90.
112. Id. at 291.
113. Id. at 293 n.6.
114. Id. at 295-96 (voucher rule rests on idea that party who calls witness
"vouches" for his credibility and therefore cannot impeach him).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 302.
117. Id. at 295-97.
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construed,' 8 thereby finding unconstitutional any state evidentiary
law that excludes testimony without a compelling reason during a
criminal trial, such an interpretation is not widely accepted by legal
scholars." 9 Commentators have stated that "the Court's nartow
rationale is not very conducive to [the] use of the opinion as a
basis for holding [a rape-shield law] invalid on its face."'' 0
First, in reversing the conviction, the Court stressed that the
holding was specific to "the facts and circumstances of this case.' 2'
That is, the excluded testimony "was critical to Chambers' defense' 22
and "bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was
Well within the basic rationale of the exception for declarations
against interest."' 23 Second, the Court stressed the antiquated nature
of the voucher rule 2 4 and noted that such rules had "been rejected
altogether by the [then] newly proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence .... "5 Finally, the Court concluded that the accused's right
to defend himself outweighed the state's interest in upholding these
evidentiary rules. 26
118. But cf. State v. Gardner, 13 Wash. App. 194, 534 P.2d 140 (1975). The
court stated the Chambers rule as. f6llows:
The minimal evidentiary criteria which must be met before any declaration
can be considered as rising to constitutional stature are these: (1) the
declarant's testimony is otherwise unavailable; (2) the declaration is an
admission of an unlawful act; (3) the declaration is inherently inconsistent
with the guilt of the accused; and (4) there are such corroborating facts
and circumstances surrounding the making of the declaration as to clearly
indicate that it has a high probability of trustworthiness.
Id. at 198-99, 534 P.2d at 142.
119. See Westen, Compulsory Process, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 71, 151-52 (1974)
[hereinafter Westen].
120. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5387, at 567.
121. 410 U.S. at 303.
122. Id. at 302.
123. Id.
124. The Court made the following observation:
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule are uncertain, it
appears to be a remnant of primitive English trial practice in which
"oath-takers" or "compurgators" were called to stand behind a particular
party's position in any controversy. Their assertions were strictly partisan
and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal trials today, their role bore little
relation to the impartial ascertainment of the facts.
Id. at 296.
125. Id. at 296 n.9.
126. Id. at 302. The Court stressed that "the right to confront and to cross-
examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. But its denial or significant dim-
inution calls into question the ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding process' and
requires that the competing interest be closely examined." Id. at 295 (quoting
Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)) (citation omitted).
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Furthermore, the Chambers Court itself was careful to point out
that it "establish[ed] no new principles of constitutional law." '1 27
Rather, the Court stated that the holding does not:
[S]ignal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to
the [s]tates in the establishment and implementation of their own
criminal trial rules and procedures. . . . [W]e hold quite simply
that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings
of the trial court deprived [the defendant] of a fair trial. 28
The decision has been called one of the " 'most important consti-
tutional law case[s] in the field of criminal evidence .. ".29 Yet,
no decision by the Supreme Court since Chambers has held that
the accused has a constitutional right to introduce any type of
evidence thought inadmissible under state rules of evidence.3 0
The uncertainty concerning the scope of the decision has left state
courts to' interpret the opinion. 3' Although Chambers has been
construed to require the admission of hearsay statements when a
defendant endeavored to establish a defense of entrapment,' and
when a defendant attempted to admit opinion evidence regarding
the results of a polygraph test,'33 the hearsay statements offered in
those cases had strong indicia of reliabilty. 3 4 Indeed, the Chambers
Court stressed the reliability of the hearsay statements offered at
trial.'35 Thus, "the overwhelming reliability of the particular hearsay
127. Id. at 302.
128. Id. at 302-03.
129. See Westen, supra note 119, at 151 n.388 (quoting remarks of Judge Otto
M. Kaus, Proceedings of the 1973 Sentencing Institute for Superior Judges, 112
Cal. Rptr. at 97 (1973)).
130. Id. at 152.
131. Rudstein, Rape-Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 18 & n.81 (1976).
132. Id. (citing Kreisher v. State, 303 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. 1973)).
133. Id. (citing State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 325-26, 532 P.2d 912, 914-15 (Ct.
App. 1975), aff'd, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975)).
134. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
135. 410 U.S. at 300-01. The Court made the following observations:
First, each of McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously to a close
acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred.' Second, each one
was corroborated by some other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn
confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony
that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent
purchase of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions
provided additional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may be the
parameters of the penal-interest rationale, each confession here was in
a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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in Chambers makes it difficult to determine what the Court would
do in cases involving more questionable evidence."' 6
C. Constitutionality Upheld by State Courts
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality
of rape-shield statutes, most state courts have upheld these laws. 37
Courts have held: (1) rape-shield laws are similar to other exclusionary
rules which bar hearsay statements;131 (2) the Constitution does not
entitle the defendant to present highly inflamatory and irrelevant
evidence; 3 9 (3) both opinion and reputation evidence concerning a
complainant's past sexual history are not indicative of veracity or
consent to have sex with the defendant;""1 and (4) the complainant
in a rape prosecution needs to be shielded from the prejudice and
unnecessary embarrassment that "only serve to exacerbate the trauma
of the rape itself.' ' 4'
IV. Family Rights: Current Status of the Law
A. Background
There are no higher stakes than those of the defendant in a murder
trial; the defendant may lose his liberty' 2 or perhaps even his life.4 3
136. Westen, supra note 119, at 154.
137. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5387, at 571; see Doe v. United
States, 666 F.2d 43, 47-48 n.9 (4th Cir. 198,1) (survey of state cases).
138. See, e.g., People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 690-91, 128 Cal. Rptr.
864, 866-67 (1976); State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1, 10-11, 659 P.2d 514, 518-
19 (1983). Exclusion of hearsay testimony regarding a victim's promiscuity in Hudlow
did not violate the defendant's rights because the report lacked probative value.
Id.
139. See, e.g., Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 347, 590 S.W.2d 288, 290 (1979)
("no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence at trial"); State v. Schenck,
222 Neb. 523, 529, 384 N.W.2d 642, 647 (1986) (evidence of prior sexual history
of complainant in rape prosecution has no more relevance than would prior phil-
anthropic acts of robbery victim).
140. State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 40, 269 S.E.2d 110, 115 (1980) ("[a] woman,
just as a man, 'may be intemperate, incontinent, profane and addicted to many
other vices that ruin the reputation, and yet retain a scrupulous regard for the
truth' . . . .") (quoting Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 Watts. 380, 386 (Pa. 1835)), quoted
in Commonwealth v. Crider, 240 Pa. Super. 403, 406, 361 A.2d 352, 354 (1976).
141. Smith v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (state
rape-shield statute is constitutional "and is a valid exercise by the legislature of
this Commonwealth to prevent the victim in a sexually related crime from becoming
the defendant at the trial").
142. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE art. 125 (McKinney 1987) ("Homicide, Abortion
and Related Offenses").
143. In Furman v. Georgia, the Court held that the death penalty was pre-
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The evidence presented to the jury determines the fate of the de-
fendant.' 44 It is fundamental to the truth-gathering process that the
prosecution and the defense present to the jury only evidence that
"bears on the issue to be decided."' " 5
Accordingly, Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 which
provides that "relevant evidence generally [is] admissible [and] ir-
relevant evidence [is] inadmissible,"'' 47 constitutes "a presupposition
involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence."' 4
The requirement of relevancy 4 9 is essential-it is the framework
upon which the structure of exclusion and admission is built.'""
sumptively excessive: "[Tlhe death penalty [was] exacted with great infrequency
even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there [was] no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed from the many cases in
which it [was] not." 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972).
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), which upheld the constitutionality of
the death penalty for murder, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he most marked
indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder [was] the
legislative response to Furman." Id. at 179. At least 35 states re-enacted the death
penalty during the four-year period between Furman and Gregg. Id. at 179-80.
144. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny of
Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 141 (1983).
145. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 184, at 540 (Cleary ed. 1984)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK].
146. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 reads as follows:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
FED. R. EvID. 402.
147. Id.
148. Graham, Relevancy-The Necessary But Not Sufficient Condition of Ad-
missibility, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 599, 599 (1983) (quoting J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE OF THE COMMON LAW 264-65 (1898)) [hereinafter Graham].
149. Professor McCormick defines relevant evidence as having two elements:
materiality and probative value.
Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the
evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered
to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence
is immaterial. What is 'in issue,' . . . is within the range of the litigated
controversy . . . . The second aspect of relevance is probative value, the
tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to
prove.
McCoRMICK, supra note 145, § 185, at 541.
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence." " 'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
150. Graham, supra note 148, at 599.
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Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 5' permits courts gen-
erally to exclude evidence which is of unquestioned relevance. 5 2 The
rule is used in situations that require a balancing between the pro-
bative value of the evidence and the harm resulting from its prej-
udicial effect;' it does not represent a new development in the
law. 54 In fact, it follows the lead of the common law.' 55 Under
Rule 403, the trial judge, in his discretion, has the "power of
exclusion ... necessary to facilitate the ascertainment of truth and
to keep the conduct of the trial within bounds.' 5 6
A rape-shield statute is an example of a specific law enacted to
exclude evidence that may be considered relevant in a rape prose-
cution.'57 Federal Rule of Evidence 41211 and comparable state
statutes'59 call for exclusion of evidence in certain circumstances
dealing with the victim's prior sexual experiences. It was the judgment
of Congress and state legislatures' 60 that the admission of such
evidence would not only mislead, confuse or appeal to the prejudice
of the jury panel, 6' but would.also overshadow the truth and deter
public policy considerations.' 62
151. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 limits admissibility of evidence:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 403.
152. Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 145, § 185, at 544-45.
153. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 28-29.
154. See MCCORMICK, supra note 145, § 185, at 545.
155. See Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5
VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952).
Recognizing the trial as an adversary proceeding taking place under the
dramatic conditions of emotional disturbance, with defiance, antagonism,
surprise, sympathy, contempt, ridicule and anger permeating the atmos-
phere of the entire proceeding, and with members of the jury chosen
from the public at large with no required experience in determining
controversial issues of fact under such circumstances, the courts at an
early date excluded logically relevant circumstantial evidence when the
risks involved in the above policy considerations were found to be so
out of proportion to the probative value of the offered evidence as to
constitute a clear basis of exclusion.
Id. at 392 (emphasis in original).
156. Graham, supra note 148, at 600.
157. Id. at 599.
158. See supra note 39.
159. See supra notes 25, 30, 36, 41.
160. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5385, at 559.
161. Id.
162. See MCCORMICK, supra note 145, § 47, at 110 n.5 (quoting Attorney General
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Rape-shield statutes preclude the defendant from inquiring into
the complainant's sexual past' 63 even though the complainant is the
key witness for the prosecution.164 Rape-shield statutes, in varying
degrees, govern the admissibility of evidence of the rape victim's
character and permissible modes of proof.' 65
in a murder trial, there are additional considerations. A defendant
is permitted by statute to prove a "pertinent trait' ' '66 of the victim's
character'6 under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)'" even though
the victim cannot testify for the prosecution. Similarly, at common
law, the accused in a homicide trial may prove self-defense by
establishing that his victim was the aggressor.' 69 The underlying
rationale is that the evidence might establish that the defendant had
v. Hitchcock, Exch. 104, 154 Eng. Rep. 38 (1847)). McCormick notes the following
observation made by the court in Hitchcock.
If we lived for a thousand years instead of about sixty or seventy, and
every case were of sufficient importance, it might be possible and perhaps
proper to throw a light on matters in which every possible question might
be suggested, for the purpose of seeing by such means whether the whole
was unfounded, or what portion of it was not, and to raise every possible
inquiry as to the truth of the statements made. But I do not see how
that could be; in fact, mankind [sic] find it to be impossible. Therefore,
some line must be drawn.
Id.
163. Galvin, supra note 16, at 765-66.
164. Id. at 783-84.
165. Id. at 773.
166. Federal Rule of Evidence 404 provides the following:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that
he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (i)
Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; (2)
Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence
that the victim was the first aggressor; (3) Character of witness. Evidence
of the character of a witness, as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character, of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See MCCORMICK, supra note 145, § 193 at 572-73; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[06] (1981).
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reason to fear the victim. 7  This is commonly known as the "jus-
tification defense.""' Courts have reasoned that under the justifi-
cation defense when the character of the victim is relevant, 172 evidence
of the victim's character tends to prove conduct.' 73
Courts are divided as .to whether the defendant needs to have
previous knowledge of the victim's violent behavior in order to Claim
the justification defense."T In a majority of jurisdictions, the char-
acter of the victim is relevant and therefore admissible even if the
defendant had no previous knowledge. 75 In a minority of jurisdictions
the defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of reputation of
specific acts of violence,' 76 only when the defendant has such knowl-
edge of these acts at the time of the killing.'77 Even though the
previous acts of the victim are relevant, "the crucial fact at issue
...is not the character of the victim, but rather, the state of mind
of the defendant." 78
Where the character trait to be proved in a justification defense
involves the victim's aggressive sexual behavior, the law in the
majority of jurisdictions would permit the introduction of opinion
evidence concerning the murder victim's past sexual conduct only
in cases where the accused claims that he was defending himself
from the victim's aggressive sexual behavior.'7  Furthermore, in ju-
risdictions following the minority rule, the defendant must have had
knowledge of the victim's propensity for violent sex at the tine of
the murder itself.'1"
170. See Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 856 (1982) [hereinafter Uviller].
171. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1978).
172. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 31. Weinstein states the following:
[An accused may introduce pertinent evidence of the character of the
victim, as in support of a claim of self-defense to a charge of homi-
cide .... While its basis lies more in history and experience than in logic
an underlying justification can fairly be found in terms of the relative
presence and absence of prejudice in the various situations. In any event,
the criminal rule is so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume
almost constitutional proportions and to override doubts of the basic
relevancy of the evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).
173. Id.
174. See generally Uviller, supra note 170, at 856-57.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 857; see also People v. Miller, 39 N.Y.2d 543, 550, 349 N.E.2d 841,
846, 384 N.Y.S.2d 741, 746 (1976).
177. Miller, 39 N.Y.2d at 551, 349 N.E.2d at 847, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 174.
180. See supra notes 176-79.
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In short, in a murder trial, except when the defendant claims self-
defense, the sexual history of the victim is less relevant than in a
rape prosecution.' The reasoning behind the enactment of the rape-
shield laws'82 applies with equal force to murder trials'83 since evidence
regarding the victim's prior sexual conduct, even if relevant, 84 has
arguably far too little probative value to justify any extensive in-
quiry. 185
In addition, evidence pertaining to the victim's past sexual history,
may very well prejudice a jury.'86 The seminal study on jury behavior
in the United States, The American Jury,'87 reported that juries have
a tendency, "in crimes with victims to weigh the conduct of the
victim in judging the guilt of the defendant."' 8 A jury, after learning
of the murder victim's prior sexual conduct, might feel that "she
got what she deserved,"' 8 9 and judge the defendant not on the basis
of guilt but on the "moral worth of the victim."' 90
181. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1981). When the
defendant acquires knowledge of the victim's prior sexual conduct after the rape,
it is deemed irrelevant to the defendant's state of mind when the crime was
committed.
182. See Uviller, supra note 170, at 859. "[Tlhe whole point of the enactment
of Rule 412 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] was to change the law of relevancy
concerning 'sexual character.' " Id.
183. Jeffrey Newman, an attorney for the Jennifer Levin family, drew an analogy
to the rape-shield laws:
The public policy in the state of New York is generally to preclude an
inquiry into the complainant's sexual history-and to do so notwith-
standing the fact that the complainant will be taking the stand as the
key prosecution witness against the defendant .... Where, as here, the
defendant has gone further and killed his victim-where, in short, that
victim will not be testifying for the prosecution-surely that victim's
sexual history is no less irrelevant.
See Aggressive Defense, supra note 6, at 11, col. 1.
184. Arguably, there is another approach regarding the relevance of a murder
victim's sexual history. This approach questions whether the sexual conduct of the
murder victim is ever relevant above and beyond the traditional justification defense
considered when a defendant is on trial for murder. The victim is dead; that the
victim engaged in sex prior to the murder is immaterial since a threat to vulnerable
parts of defendant's body would fall into the rubric of the traditional justification
defense. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 90 A.D.2d 681, 455 N.Y.S.2d 882 (4th Dep't
1982).
185. Id.
186. See Berger, supra note 10, at 30.
187. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 250-51 (1966).
188. Id. at 243.
189. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5382, at 514-15.
190. Id. § 5382, at 522.
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Furthermore, in a murder trial, unlike a trial for rape, there is
no witness to claim that the testimony concerning her prior sexual
conduct interfered with her right of privacy and there is no witness
for the jury to observe. It is left to the family of the victim to
claim that the indiscriminate questioning into the intimate activities
of the deceased breaches what is considered privacy by most people. 19'
The issue, therefore, is whether the family of the murder victim has
a privacy right, under the Constitution or the common law, or
whether a testimonial privilege exists that would prevent testimony
regarding the victim's sexual past.
B. Constitutional Right of Privacy
Some privacy rights are readily inferred from the text of the
Constitution' 9 -for example, the right to be free from govermental
seizures, without probable cause' 91 and freedom of speech. 94 There
is no specific provision in the Constitution, however, which speaks
of a general right of privacy. 95 The constitutional " 'right of privacy'
has come to mean a right to engage in certain highly personal
activities.' ' 96 The Supreme Court has based this "right of privacy"
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 97 In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of zones of
privacy guaranteed under specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. 98
Justice Douglas, in Griswold v. Connecticut,'" found the existence
of the right to privacy in "penumbras, formed by emanations" 2°°
stemming from the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 0 '
191. See, e.g., Law Protects Privacy of Victim's Diary in Central Park Killing,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at A26, col. 5 ("law is clearly in accord with ordinary
decency in rejecting a claim seeking only to damage the character of the deceased
victim, by publicity or otherwise) [hereinafter Law Protects].
192. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.26, at
684 [hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA].
193. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
194. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 192, § 14.26, at 684; see U.S. CONST.
amend. 1.
195. See U.S. CONST.
196. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 192, at 684.
197. See infra notes 201-06.
198. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 192, at 684.
199. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
200. Id. at 484.
[Sipecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance .... Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the [fairst [a]mendment is
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In a line of cases dating back to 1891,202 the Court has held that
an individual is protected from state interference in areas relating
to procreation, 23 contraception, 204 marriage 2 03 and family relation-
ships. Y' These personal privacy rights have been deemed to be
fundamental and can only be abridged if the state asserts a compelling
interest.2 01
The constitutional right of privacy recognized by the Supreme
Court is, however, limited. The Court restricts only intrusions by
the government. 20 8 Furthermore, the right of privacy recognized by
the Supreme Court "terminates upon death and does not descend
one. . . . The [tlhird [a]mendment in its prohibition against the quartering
of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The [fourth [almendment explicitly
affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The [f]ifth
[a]mendment in its [slelf-[i]ncrimination [cilause enables the citizen to create
a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to
his detriment. The [njinth [a]mendment provides: 'The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.'
Id. (citations omitted from original).
201. Id.
202. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). The Court held:
In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as ... [1891]
the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee
of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under the Constitution.
In varying contexts the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found
at least the roots of that right in the [fjirst la]mendment, Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the [qourth and [fifth [a]mendments,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
at 484-85; in the [nlinth [almendment, Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of
the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' . ..
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it
clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage,
... procreation, . . . contraception, . . . family relationships, and child
rearing and education ....
Id.
203. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
204. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
205. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
206. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
207. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
208. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
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to the heirs of the deceased." 2" 9 Thus, there is no constitutional or
court defined right of privacy that would be applicable to the family
of a murder victim since only a testimonial privilege would shield
the murder victim's family interest during the judicial process.
C. Common Law Privacy
The common law right of privacy focuses on a person's "right
to be let alone." 2'"' Four distinct areas of invasion of personal privacy
rights are recognized: 21' (1) appropriation;2  (2) intentional interfer-
ence; 2' (3) public disclosure of private facts; -'4 and (4) false light.''
Virtually all jurisdictions 6 recognize at least one form of the right
of privacy. 217 When there has been publicity about an individual of
a highly objectionable nature the cause of action that accrues is
known as public disclosure of private facts.2'1
Although there has been some disagreement as to the controlling
principles in this area, all authorities agree that to be actionable the
private material disclosed to the public must be both distasteful and
offensive to the reasonable person of usual sensibilities.'1 It has
been stated that "[t]he ordinary, reasonable person [takes offense
at] . . . details of sexual relations [that] are spread before the public
209. United States v. Amalgamated Life Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 676, 679 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). Here, the government sought an administrative subpoena relating to the
death of a group of employees. Amalgamated Life Insurance Company unsuccessfully
claimed the documents were protected by a constitutional right of privacy and were
privileged. Id.
210. Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
211. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
212. Id. § 117, at 851-54 (appropriation of plaintiff's likeness or name for
defendant's benefit).
213. Id. § 117, at 854-56 (defendant's intentional interference with plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude).
214. Id. § 117, at 856-63 (highly objectional publicity about the plaintiff).
215. Id. § 117, at 863-66 (publicity which puts plaintiff in false light in public's
eye).
216. Id. § 117, at 851.
217. Id. The champions of the right to privacy were Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis. Warren and Brandeis pioneered the doctrine in The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
218. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 211, § 117, at 856.
219. Id. § 117, at 856-57. Dean Prosser listed three factors necessary for recovery:
(1) facts must be publicly disclosed-not privately; (2) facts disclosed to the public
must be private, not public; (3) disclosure of the facts must be highly offensive
to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Id. Professor Hill, however, considers
the most important factor to be "the shocking character of a disclosure." Hill,
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205,
1258 (1976).
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eye, or [when] there is a highly personal portrayal of his intimate
private characteristics or conduct. ' 220 The standard, however, does
not protect the hypersensitive.' Moreover, the tort of public dis-
closure of private facts results in a remedy of damages for the
injured party.22 The cause of action does not prevent the initial
disclosure of private facts, but merely remedies the injustice.223 This
action, therefore, would not give the family of a murder victim the
right to prevent testimony regarding the victim's sexual past.
D. Privileges
Testimonial or evidentiary privileges exist both in the common
law224 as well as in state 25 and federal statutes. 2 6 These privileges
include the attorney-client privilege,2 27 the physician-patient privi-
lege,'2  the psychotherapist-patient privilege2 9 and familial privi-
220. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 211, § 117, at 857 (footnotes omitted). In
a well known case, Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., the court held that "misfortunes
and frailties of neighbors and 'public figures' are of considerable interest . . . to
the rest of the population." Id. (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)). The court reasoned it might
have held differently if "[r]evelations ... so intimate ... and so unwarranted
• . . as to outrage the community's notions of decency" were disclosed. Sidis, 113
F.2d at 809.
221. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 211, 9§ 117, at 857.
222. Black's Law Dictionary defines a tort as "[a] private or civil wrong or
injury, other than breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy
in the form or an action for damages." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed.
1979).
223. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 211, § 117, at 857; see also Garner v.
Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546, 548-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
224. See Note, Developments-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1455-58 (1985) [hereinafter Developments].
225. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 4501-4505 (McKinney 1978).
226. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, [s]tate, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However,
in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim
or defense as to which [s]tate law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, [sitate, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with [sltate law.
Id.
227. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 4503 (McKinney 1978).
228. See id. § 4504 (McKinney 1978).
229. See Developments, supra note 224, at 1539-55.
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leges.230 Although privileges are classified as rules of evidence, they
are sometimes viewed as having the opposite effect of prominent
exclusionary rules. 23' Exclusionary rules, such as the hearsay rule or
the best evidence rule, elucidate the truth "by operating to exclude
evidence which is unreliable or which is calculated to prejudice or
mislead. ' 22 On the other hand, privileges may be seen to operate
to "preclude the consideration of competent evidence which could
aid in determining the outcome of the case . . .. "I There are two
main justifications for privileges234 -encouraging communications
which are considered socially useful"' and a privacy rationale which
focuses "on the protection that privileges afford to individual
privacy.' '236
The privacy rationale has been termed a need for all individuals 27
and "an end in itself.12 8 Privacy, however, is not always recognized
as a legal interest. 2 9 Furthermore, the need for privacy must be
balanced against society's interest in determining the truth240 -at
present there exists no testimonial or evidentiary privilege available
to family members seeking to exclude testimony of a deceased's
sexual past. The need for a testimonial privilege which would act
as a shield to prevent testimony about a murder victim's past sexual
history must also be weighed against society's need for determining
the truth.
The family of the murder victim does, however, have an interest
in protecting the reputation of the deceased by analogy to a rule
of evidence concerning the doctor-patient privilege. 24' For example,
in New York, a person who practices medicine is prohibited from
disclosing any information pertaining to the physical or mental
condition of the deceased if it would tend to disgrace the memory
of the decedent. 24 2
230. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 4502 (McKinney 1978).
231. See MCCORMICK, supra note 145, § 72, at 171.
232. Id.
233. State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land in New Castle County, 57 Del. Ch. 40,
52, 193 A.2d 799, 806 (1963).
234. Developments, supra note 224, at 1471.
235. See MCCORMICK, supra note 145, § 72, at 171.
236. Developments, supra note 224, at 1480.
237. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 13 (1973).
238. Developments, supra note 224, at 1481.
239. See id. at 1482.
240. See Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative
to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 85 (1973).
241. See supra note 228.
242. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 4504 (McKinney 1978).
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Furthermore, the medical practitioner can not give out information
that would tend to disgrace the memory of the decedent by either
an express waiver or an implied waiver by the decedent's represen-
tative.2 43 The trial judge is required to evaluate the testimony offered
and to determine whether it would be viewed as disgraceful.2 41 Pub-
licly disclosing private information regarding a murder victim's sexual
past is precisely the type of information reasonable people might
consider highly offensive.2 45 Furthermore, it is the type of material
that might disgrace the memory of the murder victim. 246
Physician, dentist and nurse (a) Confidential information privileged. Un-
less the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice
medicine or dentistry, or a registered professional or licensed practical
nurse, shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired
in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary
to enable him to act in that capacity. (b) Identification by dentist; crime
committed against patient under sixteen. A dentist shall be required to
disclose information necessary for identification of a patient. A physician,
dentist or nurse shall be required to disclose information indicating that
a patient who is under the age of sixteen years has been the victim of
a crime. (c) Mental or physical condition of deceased patient. A physician
or nurse shall be required to disclose any information as to the mental
or physical condition of a deceased patient privileged under subdivision
(a), except information which would tend to disgrace the memory of the
decedent, either in the absence of an objection by a party to the litigation
or when the privilege has been waived: 1. by the personal representative,
or the surviving spouse, or the next of kin of the decedent; or 2. in
any litigation where the interests of the personal representative are deemed
by the trial judge to be adverse to those of the estate of the decedent,
by any party in interest; or 3. if the validity of the will of the decedent
is in question, by the executor named in the will, or the surviving spouse
or any heir-at-law or any of the next of kin or any other party in
interest.
Id.
243. See id. § 4504(c).
244. Tinney v. Neilson's Flowers Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 717, 719, 305 N.Y.S.2d 713,
716 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969), aff'd, 35 A.D.2d 532, 314 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d
Dep't 1966).
245. See supra notes 218-19.
246. See Law Protects, supra note 191, at A26, col. 5; see also W. GAYLIN,
THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND 15 (1983). In stressing the importance of not
tainting the memory of the murder victim, Gaylin identifies two forms of immortality
for individuals who are not religious. The first is biological immortality, symbolized
by children and grandchildren; the second is "immortality of memory. The dead
continue to live in memories, and usually with the mythic distortion that time lends
to those who need no longer pass muster in the real world." Id.
Indeed, many philosophers argue that there can be harm after death. For example,
Aristotle said the following: "A dead man is popularly believed to be capable of
experiencing good and ill fortune-honor and dishonor, and prosperity and the
loss of it among his children and descendents generally-in exactly the same way
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V. Recommendation
Legislation should therefore be enacted extending rape-shield laws
to non-rape situations. This legislation would strictly limit the ad-
mission of evidence of a victim's sexual past. Admittedly, trial judges
already possess great discretion to exclude evidence which tends to
confuse, mislead or prejudice the jury.2 4 Nevertheless, the rationale
underlying Professor Berger's defense of restrictive rape-shield laws
is instructive:2 48
[W]arning defendants not to count on using evidence of unchastity,
spurring prosecutors to object to introduction, and reminding
judges that this kind of proof is presumptively inadmissible and
merits extremely careful scrutiny. The hope is that a clear change
in the spirit of the rules will lead to a change in their application.24
A. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation
In a murder trial, unlike a trial for rape, there is no victim-
witness. Thus, a court is not confronted with deciding whether the
defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness as to prior sexual
history.250 In addition, a court does not have to decide whether the
testimony of the rape victim pertaining to prior sexual conduct is
material.2"' Accordingly, the court is not faced with the problem of
determining the probative value of the victim's testimony.25 '
Furthermore, in a murder trial, unlike a rape trial, there is no
need to determine whether the victim's testimony bears on her
credibility. '53 Unlike a rape-defendant, the murder-defendant has no
defense if he claims he acted with the murder victim's consent.254
Therefore, the Supreme Court's concern in Davis as to the right of
a defendant to impeach a witness' credibility does not exist in a
as if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what was happening." Partridge,
Posthumous Interests & Posthumous Respect, 91 ETHICS J. 243, 243 (1975) (quoting
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1.10).
247. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
248. See Berger, supra note 10, at 34.
249. Id.; see also Sexual Politics and a Slaying, supra note 2, at B26, col. 2
("Levin case .. .assumes an added importance precisely because it comes a decade
after the change in the rape law and after the consciousness-raising attempts of'
the feminist movement .....




254. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(l)(b) (McKinney 1986).
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murder trial. The victim is not alive to be impeached. The Davis
analysis, therefore, would not be applicable to legislation which
extends the protection of rape-shield statutes to deceased victims of
sex crimes. Thus, if states were to enact statutes prohibiting the
admissibility of testimony regarding a murder victim's past sexual
behavior, the defendant's sixth amendment rights as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Davis would not be infringed.
If Chambers v. Mississippi is broadly construed, however, the
accused in a murder trial would have the constitutional right to
introduce any exculpatory evidence, including reliable hearsay state-
ments pertaining to the victim's past sexual conduct.2 5 These state-
ments would be barred only if the hearsay evidence was so unreliable
that the jury would have no rational basis to determine its truth. 256
If, however, Chambers is interpreted narrowly, the holding would
be limited to the facts of the case.257 A narrow interpretation seems
more defensible in that rape-shield statutes have generally been
upheld.251
Similarly, in a murder trial, the value of any statements made
about the victim's prior sexual conduct is questionable. It would be
virtually impossible to verify259 any statements made by sexual part-
ners of the deceased since there would be no witnesses to the sex
act itself. In addition, the right of compulsory process that Chambers
requires is different from that in a murder/sex trial since one must
consider the reliability of the evidence introduced. 260 Indeed, evidence
of the victim's past sexual history is not necessarily exculpatory in
the Chambers sense. 261 In Chambers the exculpatory evidence was
a confession by a third party to the murder itselfP62-the jury did
not need to draw an inference between the evidence introduced and
the confession.163 On the other hand, evidence proffered concerning
the deceased victim's prior sexual history can only be inferential 24-
placing doubt in the jury's mind and failing to establish separate
255. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
259. "Because sexual activity, criminal or otherwise, is usually conducted in
private, the state almost always establishes its substantive case [in a rape prosecution]
through the complainant's testimony." Galvin, supra note 16, at 896.
260. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
262. 410 U.S. 297 (1973).
263. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
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conclusive facts. Thus, Chambers v. Mississippi Would not apply to
legislation that would bar testimony concerning the past sexual higtory
of the deceased victim.
Finally, even if a court were to determine that a deceased victim's
prior sexual conduct was relevant evidence,2 61 the court must de-
termine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by prejudice.166 The sixth amendment does not require
admissibility of such prejudicial, yet probative, evidence.2 61 It is well
settled that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to
present evidence on his behalf thaet is irrelevant and prejudicial.2 68
B. Proposed Legislation
The following provisions should be included in a proposed statute
that extends the protection of rape-shield laws to murder victims:2 69
Evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct shall not be admissible
unless such evidence: (1) proves or tends to prove specific instances
of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the accused; or (2) proves
or tends to prove that the defendant believed that he was in
imminent danger of an assault by specific acts of violent sex with
the victim which reasonably relate to the murder; or (3) is de-
termined by the court after a hearing away from the proximity
of the jury, or such hearing as the court may require, to be
265. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text for a general discussion of
relevancy. See also Feminism Goes Beyond Civil Libertarianism: Two Cases Not
Alike, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1987, at A22, col. 6.
[Dlepending on what precisely Mr. Chambers intends to show by way
of Miss Levin's 'sexual aggressiveness', the evidence may be wholly
irrelevant or at least insufficiently relevant (in light of its probable
tendency to mislead or unfairly prejudice the jury) to justify its intro-
duction even by a criminal defendant.
Specific examples of acts with other people that closely resemble the
conduct Mr. Chambers claims Miss Levin engaged in with him might
be pertinent and admissible. But generalized accounts that Miss Levin
routinely 'came on' to men or was sexually loose or performed certain
types of sexual acts that were not distinctive and directly related to his
defense might well be excludable.
Exclusion would, moreover, be constitutional and not unfair in the
circumstances. Criminal defendants are not exempt from the rules of
evidence, nor should they be.
Id.
266. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
267. See Graham, supra note 148, at 599.
268. Id.
269. Several provisions are adopted from the New York rape-shield statute. See
supra note 36.
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relevant and admissible in the interests of justice. The court must
issue a statement saying that its findings of fact were essential
to its determination.
VI. Conclusion
Enactment of this proposed legislation would shift the focus of
the finders of fact away from the victim's moral worth to the actions
and culpability of the defendant. In addition, this legislation would
continue the program of the rape reform movement and help to
abandon rigid and traditional assumptions inherent in the legal
system.2 70 Finally, this legislation should help put to rest the "blame
the victim" ' 27' defense often used by attorneys in sex cases. Such
legislation would also serve to protect a defendant's sixth amendment
rights of compulsory process. Thus, a defendant would not be denied
his Chambers v. Mississippi defense. 272 That is, if the defendant has
exculpatory evidence that bears "assurances of trustworthiness, '273
it will be admitted. At the same time, the state's interest in having
relevant evidence presented at trial will be strengthened.
Joan L. Brown
270. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
271. See Sexual Politics and a Slaying, supra note 2, at B26, col. 1; supra note
2 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 108-28 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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